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Sovereign	Defaults	Before	International	Courts	and	
Tribunals	
	
Michael	Waibel	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011)	
428	pp.	
C$135.95	
	
John	A.	E.	Pottow*	&	Emily	Himes	Iversen**	
	
In	the	wake	of	the	Great	Recession,	sovereign	debt	has	enjoyed	a	resurgence	
of	academic	attention.	In	addition	to	(in)famous	defaults	such	as	Argentina’s,	the	
looming	possibility	of	sovereign	debt	non‐payment	lurks	behind	many	post‐
recession	political	crises,	as	is	the	case	with	the	controversial	cross‐default	clauses	
in	Russia’s	loans	to	the	Ukraine.1	Public	debt	more	broadly	has	become	more	
perilous	in	municipal	markets	as	well.	For	example,	Detroit’s	bankruptcy	has	served	
as	a	stark	reminder	of	how	unsafe	purportedly	“safe”	government	investments	can	
prove	to	be	–	and	how	the	default	of	public	debt	implicates	services	to	the	polity.		
Inspired	by	these	vivid	news	events,	the	recent	explosion	of	scholarship	on	
sovereign	debt	has	brought	no	shortage	of	new	policy	proposals.2	To	this	fray,	
Michael	Waibel	offers	an	important	insight:	we	have	been	here	before.	Indeed,	
Waibel’s	painstaking	historical	analysis	in	Sovereign	Defaults	Before	International	
Courts	and	Tribunals	offers	a	careful	study	that	should	be	read	by	all	who	want	to	
join	this	debate.	Only	through	such	analysis	can	we	seen	how	the	various	modalities	
of	public	debt	restructuring	in	the	past	have	worked	–	and	failed	–	and	thus	have	an	
informed	discussion	of	how	to	move	forward.	
	
Waibel	begins	in	the	mid‐nineteenth	century,	when	“half	of	all	US	state	debt	
was	in	default,	and	10	per	cent	was	repudiated	outright.”3	He	proceeds	to	recount	
two	centuries	of	sovereign	debt	disputes	all	around	the	world.	From	the	Dominican	
Republic’s	former	receivership4	to	the	Ottoman	public	debt	commission5	to	modern‐
																																																								
*	Professor	of	Law,	University	of	Michigan	Law	School.	
**	University	of	Michigan	Law	School,	Class	of	2014.	
1	Anna	Gelpern,	“Ukraine’s	Russian	Bonds	–	A	Gazprom	Clause?”	(27	April	2014)	
online:	<http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/sovereign‐debt/>.	
2	See,	e.g.,	Symposium,	The	Nation	State	and	Its	Bank:	The	International	Regulation	of	
Financial	Institutions,	Financial	Products,	and	Sovereign	Debt	(2014)	49	Tex	Int’l	LJ	
149.	
3	Michael	Waibel,	Sovereign	Defaults	Before	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	at	3.	
4	Ibid.	at	47.	
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day	Argentina,6	Waibel’s	work	spans	the	lengthy	and	surprisingly	diverse	history	of	
international	attempts	to	grapple	with	the	ability	of	the	modern	nation‐state	to	
incur	debts	beyond	its	capacity	(or	willingness)	to	pay.	He	provides	an	exhaustive	
account	of	a	variety	of	techniques	used	to	address	defaults,	from	military	force7	to	
quasi‐receivership8	to	arbitration	clauses9	to	mixed‐claims	commissions,10	generally	
tracing	an	arc	from	political	diplomacy	to	more	adjudicative	frameworks,	such	as	
claims	tribunals	and,	yes,	domestic	courts.11	He	also	shows	how	“host”	governments	
were	actively	involved,	both	in	designing	proposals	for	restructurings	and	stymieing	
the	atomistic	collection	attempts	of	their	citizen‐creditors.12	Throughout	his	book,	
Waibel	does	not	shy	away	from	addressing	factors,	such	as	state	succession	and	
odious	debt,	that	can	make	already	complicated	foreign	default	cases	even	more	
contentious.13	
	
For	the	legal	historian,	or	quite	frankly,	just	general	nerd,	the	book	is	delight.		
For	the	scholar	or	policymaker	seeking	more	normative	punch,	the	book	is	more	
disappointing.	But	Waibel	is	unapologetic	about	his	mission.	The	primary	purpose	of	
Sovereign	Defaults	is	not	to	persuade	readers	of	the	merits	of	a	single	coherent	
theory	of	sovereign	default	but	rather	to	analyze	“a	wide	range	of	cases”	in	order	to	
find	“organizing	principles	relevant	to	the	future	adjudication	of	sovereign	
defaults.”14	While	Waibel	does	tantalize	with	some	tentative	arguments	built	on	his	
exhaustive	analysis	towards	the	end	of	Sovereign	Defaults	(such	as,	e.g.,	the	
impropriety	of	using	International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	
(ICSID)	panels	to	restructure	public	debt),15	the	book’s	insights	stick	primarily	to	its	
stated	scope.	
		
It	is	difficult	to	overstate	the	depth	of	Waibel’s	detailed	analysis	of	the	
jurisprudence	of	sovereign	debt	disputes.	Throughout	his	work,	Waibel	scatters	
fascinating	and	perhaps‐forgotten	historical	anecdotes,	such	as	the	travails	of	
investors	in	the	“sovereign”	bonds	of	Poyais.	The	bonds	for	the	“newly	independent”	
state	had	a	beautiful	prospectus	but,	unfortunately,	the	country	itself	was	entirely	
																																																																																																																																																																					
5	Ibid.	at	129.	
6	Ibid.	at	289.	
7	Ibid.	at	29‐38.	
8	Ibid.	at	42‐57.	
9	Ibid.	at	passim.	
10	Ibid.	at	171‐182.			
11	Ibid.	at	121.	
12	Ibid.	at	23	(discussing	how	creditor	countries	traditionally	enjoyed	“complete	
functional	control	over	claims	arising	from	sovereign	debt”	and	intervened	“only	
after	determining	that	internationalizing	the	claim	to	a	higher	level	was	consistent	
with	the	government’s	broader	economic	and	political	objectives.”).	
13	Ibid.	at	129‐143.	
14	Ibid.	at	19.	
15	Ibid.	at	316.	
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fictional.16	And	he	notes	with	quiet	understatement	how	even	investors	in	real	
countries	can	find	themselves	in	similarly	absurd	situations.	Following	the	Soviet	
repudiation	of	Czarist	debts,	for	example,	investors	in	Russian	sovereign	debt	had	to	
wait	until	the	1980s	or	even	later	to	have	their	claims	resolved.17	But	that	is	how	it	
should	be,	Waibel	implies,	in	the	loose	world	of	debt	restructuring.	Creditors	are	
beggars	in	this	world,	in	contrast	to	their	chooser	status	in	most	municipal	
insolvency	systems.		
	
Indeed,	of	particular	interest	to	bankruptcy	scholars	will	be	the	comparisons	
drawn	between	the	ad	hoc	and	quasi‐formalized	systems	of	sovereign	default	
resolution	and	the	more	familiar	bankruptcy	systems	under	municipal	laws,	
especially	their	cross‐border	subfields.	The	big	difference	is	that	dissident‐binding	
voting	powers	are	generally	absent	in	the	sovereign	debt	realm.	As	Waibel	notes	
following	Itoh	v	People’s	Republic	of	the	Congo,	“This	award	demonstrates	the	
inability	of	countries	in	current	international	law	to	bind	all	creditors	to	a	
restructuring	agreement,	even	if	such	agreement	is	reached	in	the	Paris	Club.”18	
[Although,	to	be	fair,	Waibel	also	notes	their	manufacture	ex	contract	through	
collective	action	clauses	(CACs).]	Similarities	between	sovereign	debt	and	domestic	
insolvency	systems	include	such	familiar	friends	as	fights	about	choice	of	law	and	
the	(in)ability	to	pay	and,	of	course,	the	ever‐present	battle	over	priority.19	
	
Perhaps	the	most	interesting	historical	lesson	for	comparison	to	municipal	
insolvency	law	is	the	sovereign	debt	field’s	persistent	resistance	to	explicit	haircuts.	
Payments	of	debt	may	be	postponed	or	placed	on	more	favorable	terms,	but	there	is	
great	concern,	probably	animated	by	moral	hazard	worries,	over	outright	
concessions.	For	example,	during	the	1920’s	the	U.S.	government	held	
approximately	$24	million	in	Austrian	bonds.20	Congress	found	that	“the	economic	
structure	of	Austria	is	approaching	collapse	and	great	numbers	of	the	people	of	
Austria	are,	in	consequence,	in	imminent	danger	of	starvation	and	threatened	by	
disease	growing	out	of	extreme	privation	and	starvation.”21		However,	the	solution	
proposed	by	Congress,	and	the	United	Nations,	was	not	to	take	an	explicit	haircut	
but	rather	to	extend	the	maturity	by	twenty	years.22	While	a	municipal	insolvency	
lawyer	might	be	surprised	by	this	trend,	its	longevity	may	be	in	question	post‐
Argentina,	and	certainly	post‐Detroit.		But	the	comparativist	to	municipal	law	
should	also	take	heed	of	the	normative	resistance	to	the	private	debt	model.		Several	
																																																								
16	Ibid.	at	10.		
17	Ibid.	at	39	
18	Ibid.	at	153.	
19	Ibid.	at	63,	86.	
20	Ibid.	at	114	
21	Ibid.	
22	Ibid.	at	114‐15.	The	historical	bent	of	the	analysis	necessarily	underemphasizes	
the	rise	of	deeply	indebted	developing	nations	who	are	accorded	debt	relief	but	who	
find	themselves	more	in	dialogue	with	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	than	the	public	
markets	anyway.	
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cases	Waibel	explores	raise	questions	about	the	desirability	of	moving	towards	an	
international	insolvency	system	at	all.	In	the	Venezuelan	Preferential	Case,	for	
instance,	Britain	argued	that	parallels	to	municipal	bankruptcy	law	were	wholly	
inapposite,	and	indeed	“any	such	procedure	must	necessarily	be	incompatible	with	
the	continued	existence	of	the	insolvent	state	as	an	independent	sovereign	state.”23	
	
As	mentioned,	Waibel	generally	shies	away	from	argument,	but	in	Part	II	of	
his	book,	he	gradually	turns	from	history	towards	a	more	normative	perspective.		
For	example,	he	rejects	the	rise	(fad?)	of	ICSID	tribunals,	grimly	concluding	that	
“ICSID	tribunals	–	in	addition	to	lacking	jurisdiction	–	are	unable	to	effectively	deal	
with	sovereign	debt	crises.”24	Part	of	Waibel’s	objection	is	merely	doctrinal:	ICSID	
lacks	jurisdiction,	he	contends,	because	sovereign	debt	instruments	fail	to	satisfy	the	
“objective	core	meaning	of	‘investment’”	in	the	Convention	on	the	Settlement	of	
Investment	Disputes	between	Disputes	and	Nationals	of	Other	States	(“the	
Convention”).25	In	reaching	this	conclusion,	he	builds	on	Schreuer’s	work	in	
elaborating	a	five‐element	test	regarding	the	typical	characteristics	of	an	
“investment”	under	the	Convention.26	According	to	Waibel,	sovereign	bonds	clearly	
lack	a	relation	to	some	of	his	elements,	such	as	association	with	a	commercial	
undertaking	and	the	sharing	of	commercial	risk,	and	have	only	a	tenuous	connection	
to	another,	the	territorial	link	with	the	host	country.27	But	he	goes	beyond	this	
doctrinal	critique.	As	a	normative	matter,	finally	showing	his	argument	colours,	
Waibel	contends	that	it	is	right	that	there	is	no	jurisdiction:	
	
If	sovereign	debt	were	to	qualify	as	an	investment,	then	the	jurisdictional	
reach	of	ICSID	becomes	extremely	broad.	.	.	.	The	likely	effect	would	be	to	
convert	ICSID	tribunals	into	commercial	courts	of	general	jurisdiction,	in	lieu	
of	domestic	courts	called	on	to	adjudicate	such	disputes	by	virtue	of	
contractual	dispute	resolution	clauses.28	
	
This	additional	enforcement	prospect	would	be	undesirable	(perhaps	iniquitous)	
because	it	would	undermine	global	“economic	policy	flexibility”	during	crises	by	
causing	creditor	governments	to	“lose	their	traditional	role	as	diplomatic	
gatekeeper”	to	the	scope	of	recovery,	if	any,	afforded	bondholders.29	Moreover,	it	
would	strip	debtor	governments	of	their	immunity	trumps	to	demur	payment	and	
thus	“derail	efforts	by	the	international	community	to	resolve	debt	crises	in	an	
																																																								
23	Ibid.	at	33.		
24	Ibid.	at	316.	
25	Ibid.	at	230.	
26	Ibid.	at	230‐244.	
27	Two	additional	elements,	the	existence	of	a	positive	impact	on	development	and	
the	long‐term	transfer	of	financial	resources,	would	vary	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	
Ibid.	
28	Ibid.	at	251.	
29	Ibid.	at	316.		
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orderly	manner.”30	In	other	words,	if	pushy	creditors	can	actually	force	
governments	to	cough	up	and	pay	by	getting	adjudicative	access,	such	as	through	
these	tribunals,	then	we	face	an	outcome	fraught	with	policy	problems.	There	is	a	
need	to	counterbalance	creditor	repayment	with	the	attendant	loss	of	public	
services	to	the	incumbent	residents	of	the	debtor	nation,	which	may	have	difficulty	
in	paying	anything	close	to	the	full	notional	amount,	and	this	balancing	may	be	
better	suited	for	political	actors	than	investment	tribunals.31	
	
The	main	problem	with	Waibel’s	arguments	are	that	they	are	
underdeveloped.	Other	than	flagging	the	issue	and	naively	resting	on	an	unstated	
premise	that	debtor	countries	need	protection	from	rapacious	lenders,	Waibel	does	
not	engage	the	counterargument	of	debtor	recalcitrance,	a	topic	highly	salient	given	
Argentina’s	trip	to	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court.32	And	there	is	something	potentially	
unsettling	about	blaming	ICSID	arbitration,	as	the	venue	for	the	vindication	of	the	
legal	rights	of	creditors,	for	the	problem	of	the	holdout	without	discussion	of	the	
incidence	of	holding	out.33	Still,	it	seems	churlish	to	fault	an	author	who	by	design	is	
trying	to	avoid	normative	debate,	and	so	it	is	perhaps	more	fair	simply	to	observe	
that	the	critical	discussion	leaves	the	reader	hungering	for	more.	
	
Where	Waibel	gets	most	creative	is	in	exploring	the	future.	Capitalizing	on	
the	rise	of	arbitration	of	cross‐border	disputes,	Waibel	suggests	institutions	might	
be	constructed	that	could	effectively	arbitrate	sovereign	debt.	He	argues	that	this	
will	only	be	possible	if	certain	preconditions	are	met,	however,	including	“dedicated	
and	durable	institutions,	the	progressive	development	of	the	international	law	on	
public	debt,	and	protection	for	the	country’s	essential	public	services	in	financial	
distress.”34	The	fact	that	arbitration	may	be	useful	is	all	the	more	interesting	given	
the	past	historical	examples	Waibel	unearths	showing	its	prior	use	–	before	it	got	
crowded	out	by	a	more	capacious	assertion	of	municipal	court	jurisdiction.35	
																																																								
30	Ibid.	at	317.	
31	Ibid.	at	318.		Indeed,	Waibel’s	collection	of	cases	–	including	private	arbitrations	–	
where	“ability	to	pay”	is	legally	adjudicated	is	fascinating	in	showing	that	sometimes	
this	question	can,	and	does,	get	resolved	legally.		Ibid	at	88‐98.	Noteworthy	too	are	
the	defensive	doctrines	sometimes	used	to	shoehorn	in	an	ability‐to‐pay	test,	such	
as,	e.g.,	unexpected	devaluation.	Ibid.	at	86‐87.	Other	commentators,	including	one	
of	us,	fret	that	ability‐to‐pay	analysis	may	be	too	politically	sensitive	today	for	
binding	resolution.	John	AE	Pottow,	“Mitigating	the	Problem	of	Vulture	Holdout:	
International	Certification	Boards	for	Sovereign‐Debt	Restructurings”	(2014)	49	Tex	
Int’l	LJ	219	at	239.	
32	See	e.g.	Republic	of	Argentina	v	NML	Capital,	Ltd.,	__	U.S.	__,	2014	U.S.	LEXIS	4167	
(2014).		
33	See	Id.	at	320	(discussing	increased	incentives	to	hold	out	if	ICSID’s	jurisdiction	is	
increased).		In	fairness,	one	of	us	makes	the	same	empirical	assumption	elsewhere.	
See	Pottow,	supra	note	31.	
34	Waibel,	supra	note	3	at	323.	
35	Ibid.	at	157.		
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Sovereign	Defaults	is	comprehensible	enough	to	be	read	by	students	yet	
comprehensive	enough	to	provide	new	insights	into	public	debt	restructuring	for	
even	experienced	scholars.	Lawyers	and	historians	alike	will	find	something	new	in	
its	pages.	Even	in	a	world	of	CACs,	the	subject	matter	remains	topical	and,	linked	
with	the	rise	of	arbitration,	important.	Poor	Weibel’s	publication	date	means	he	
missed	out	on	Argentina,36	Greece,	and	the	revision	of	UNCITRAL’s	arbitration	rules,	
showing	just	how	fast‐moving	this	field	is.	But	that	is	no	matter:	Weibel’s	study	is	
careful,	useful,	and	helps	inform	the	debate	in	this	increasingly	vital	policy	arena.		
																																																								
36	See	NML	Capital,	Ltd.,	__	U.S.	__,	2014	U.S.	LEXIS	4167.	
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